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Grassroots Plea Bargaining
Josh Bowers∗
ABSTRACT
In the 1990s, New York City implemented a particularly vigorous brand of
localized order-maintenance policing. Such targeted enforcement of “borderline”
offenses led to a skyrocketing rate of non-felony arrests in affected (predominantly
poor and minority) communities and, consequently, created a crisis of systemic
legitimacy within these communities. Notably, however, enforcement was
increasingly heavy-handed only on the policing end. By contrast, when it came to
plea bargaining, prosecutors were providing more and more lenient no-time or
short-time pleas to reduced (often non-criminal) charges. In this essay, I offer a
novel (and at least partial) explanation for this leniency trend. My explanation is
a heretofore unrecognized plea-bargaining influence that I call grassroots plea
bargaining. By grassroots plea bargaining, I mean a bottom-up pressure that in
certain circumstances may lead prosecutors to reduce plea prices in order to
purchase communal acquiescence to police policies that otherwise lack public
support. In short, as police ramp up enforcement, prosecutors may feel the need to
pull back on the punishment throttle to ensure that affected communities accept—
or at least tolerate—hard-nosed police tactics.

INTRODUCTION
There is nothing new to the claim that plea bargaining typically
occurs outside the shadow of law.1 This failure of bargaining to reflect
statutory law is most apparent in petty cases.2 For me, no story captures
that reality better than the experiences of my former client, Eddie Wise.
Eddie had a long record. In addition to several convictions for legitimate
crimes, Eddie had also repeatedly pled guilty to loitering for the purposes
of begging, an offense that the Second Circuit had held unconstitutional in

∗

Bigelow Fellow and Lecturer in Law, University of Chicago Law School. I am indebted
to a number of individuals who provided valuable comments. Specifically, I would like to
thank the participants at the Conference on Plea Bargaining at Marquette Law School,
where I presented an earlier draft of this essay. I would like to personally thank Daniel
Abebe, Douglas Baird, Daniel Barnhizer, Robin Effron, Dave Fagundes, Bernard
Harcourt, Jonathan Masur, and Jamelle Sharpe.
1 See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing
Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548 (2004); Stephanos Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the
Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463 (2004).
2 See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. __, at Parts III-IV
(forthcoming 2008), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=983819.
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1993.3 No valid law remained in place to cast a shadow. Nevertheless,
Eddie kept getting arrested and charged. And he kept pleading out.
Lawyers ultimately launched a class-action suit to enjoin
enforcement of the long-defunct loitering statute.4 Their suit revealed that
Eddie was far from alone. In fact, the New York City Police Department
(NYPD) had arrested 1,876 people on the unconstitutional charge between
1992 and 2004.5 Remarkably, even after the 2005 suit was filed, police
made an additional fifty-eight arrests under the statute and issued 641
summonses.6
This example of bargaining and punishment outside the shadow of
valid law is admittedly extreme. But it is not necessarily surprising.
Police, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and defendants pay little attention
to what the law is;7 they pay attention, instead, to past practices that
serve as precedents for parties’ future expectations and performance.8
Plea bargaining provides notice to the public (and even sometimes the
institutional actors) of what the system proscribes. Especially in lowstakes cases, plea bargaining is shaped principally by institutional
pressures and cognitive errors, and hardly at all by penal codes.9
To identify a few of these plea-bargaining pressures: prosecutors
and defense attorneys are influenced by caseload, political climate,
workgroup principles of cooperation, career and reputation concerns,
personal perspectives of just punishment and sundry other idiosyncratic

N.Y. Penal Law § 240.35(1) (“A person is guilty of loitering when he . . . [l]oiters,
remains or wanders about in a public place for the purpose of begging”); Loper v. N.Y.
City Police Dep’t, 999 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding peaceful begging to constitute
protected speech); see also Jess Wisloski & Thomas Zambito, It Beggars Belief, City
Hands Panhandler 100G for 27 Bad Arrests, NEW YORK DAILY NEWS, Dec. 12, 2006, at 3;
Elva Rodriguez, Robert Gearty And Tracy Connor, Beggar Gets Change, Wins Suit
Forcing City to Lay off Panhandlers, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 11, 2005, at 3 (noting that
Eddie was convicted under statute seven times after it was held unconstitutional).
4 Rodriguez, et al., supra note 3.
5 Wisloski & Zambito, supra note 3, at 3; see also Jim Dwyer, Police Charged
Panhandlers Under Unconstitutional Law, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 2005, at B1.
6 Kati Cornell, Beggar Buster Blues, Judge Blasts NYPD, N.Y. POST, Nov. 30, 2005, at
39.
7 William J. Stuntz, Self-Defeating Crimes, 86 VA. L. REV. 1871, 1898-99 (2000) (“We
need to think of criminal law as having less to do with codes and court opinions than
with policing strategies and . . . prosecutors’ charging patterns.”)
8 See MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 120-21 (1978) (“After obtaining a specific
plea bargain . . . [defense attorneys] treat this disposition as a ‘precedent’. . . .
Prosecutors, in turn, admit that they are subject to these ‘habits of disposition.’ . . . Thus,
a good defense deal in one case can have a trickle-down effect.”); see also Bowers, supra
note 2.
9 See, e.g., sources supra note 1.
3
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preferences.10 Defendants, of course, hope for minimal sentence length,
but in petty cases they bargain first and foremost in the shadow of their
own process costs—most notably, potential pretrial detention.11 Even in
the rare instances where parties try to reach shadow-of-law bargains that
approximate post-trial sentence length (discounted by the probability of
acquittal), cognitive biases cloud their abilities to agree on such accurate
figures.12 Overall, then, it is more appropriate to say that criminal law
exists in the shadow of plea bargaining—not the other way around.13
What then do I hope to add to this well-tread topic? The answer is
something quite small, yet meaningful. We can think of the heretofore
recognized influences on plea bargaining as either existing at the
institutional level or arising out of the actors themselves (for instance, out
of their own punishment preferences or cognitive limitations).14 But there
is another very real unrecognized pressure that leads prosecutors to set
low prices outside the shadow of trial. It is a bottom-up—or vertical—
pressure that I call grassroots plea bargaining.
Grassroots plea bargaining is a prosecutorial response to certain
communities’ views on crime and enforcement. It should not, however, be
mistaken for previously observed prosecutorial efforts to temper
punishment for particular sympathetic defendants or to reconstruct
draconian or ill-considered legislation to reflect personal and local views of
proportionality.15 By grassroots plea bargaining, I mean a systematic
10 See HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 104-05; Bibas, supra note 1, at 2492-93; Albert W.
Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 52-54 (1968);
see also Bowers, supra note 2, at Parts III-IV.
11 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2491-93 (“[T]he shadow of pretrial detention looms much
larger over these small cases than does the shadow of trial.”); see also Josh Bowers, supra
note 2, at Part II.
12 See Bibas, supra note 1, at 2496-2519.
13 By way of further example from my own practice, when it came to bargaining over
sentence length, it mattered not at all (nor would I even necessarily notice) whether a
client was charged with Trespass in the Second Degree (an A-misdemeanor, punishable
by up to one-year jail) or Trespass in the Third Degree (a B-misdemeanor, punishable by
up to 90-days jail) or unlawful Trespass (a non-criminal violation, punishable by up to
15-days jail). N.Y.P.L. §§ 140.05-15. The “going rate” for the plea was almost always
tantamount to time served. In short, the bargained-for sentence length remained wholly
independent of the charge level. To the extent the codes mattered, it was only in the
coarsest of ways: Was the charge a misdemeanor or a non-criminal violation? If it was a
misdemeanor, was a plea bargain to a violation available?
14 See Ronald Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal Criminal
Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 109 n.84 (2005) (categorizing plea bargaining’s recognized
shadow-of-law failures as either “built into the institutional arrangements of the
criminal courtroom . . . [or] growing out of common human failures to process
information rationally”).
15 See H. RICHARD UVILLER, VIRTUAL JUSTICE 197 (1996) (“What I thought I was doing,
mainly, in the run-of-the-docket case, was . . . rewriting the law, modifying the judgment
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prosecutorial reduction of plea prices—even in circumstances where
prosecutors find such reductions otherwise unwarranted—in order to
purchase communal acquiescence to enforcement policies that otherwise
lack public support.
Grassroots plea bargaining goes hand-in-hand with quality-of-life
(or order-maintenance) policing. The citizens of many poor minority
communities harbor both deep crime fears and animosity to aggressive
enforcement. They want restoration of public order, but not at the high
costs of living under constant police suspicion or losing children, friends,
and neighbors to jail cells. As police turn up enforcement pressure,
prosecutors may feel the need to pull back on the punishment throttle to
ensure that these communities accept—or at least tolerate—hard-nosed
police tactics.
At first blush, this might seem a strange and inefficient way of
doing business. Either public-order policing is a good idea or it is not. On
the first score, if it is a good idea, it would seem that citizens arrested
under public-order policing should face the same sanction that citizens
faced pre-implementation of the new policing strategy. But efficient
deterrence is not so clean a concept. Enforcement can engender its own
resistance. Zero-tolerance policing of borderline offenses (or, in Eddie
Wise’s case, non-offenses) may undermine deterrence and anti-crime
norms by increasing disaffection with the police while concurrently
creating sympathy for a growing cadre of petty-offense defendants—
individuals who might have faced tickets or warnings in other times but
now face summary arrests.
On the second score, if public-order policing is not a good idea (for
social-norms or any other reasons), then police should just soften
enforcement, instead of leaving that task to prosecutors at the back-end.
One might wonder why police would engage in the expensive practice of
mass arrest and processing only to permit defendants to subsequently
plead out and go home. But this objection ignores the fact that the
principal benefits of public-order policing are realized not in the
sentencing but in the processing of arrests themselves. For police, ordermaintenance enforcement is more than just a way to fix “broken
windows,” it’s a highly useful—albeit potentially normatively
problematic—tool to search and catalogue data about large segments of
the population of poor minority neighborhoods.

of the legislature to fit the circumstances of the crime, in accord with what I perceived to
be the prevailing ethic in the courts of my time and place.”); HEUMANN, supra note 8, at
109 (describing how prosecutor “redefines his professional goals” in face of statutes that
“sweep too broadly”); Stuntz, supra note 1, at 2549; Bibas, supra note 1, at 2470;
Alschuler, supra note 10, at 52-54 (describing prosecutors who try to “do the right
thing”).
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Ultimately, then, prosecutors lose little by reducing conviction
charges to non-criminal violations16 and by lowering sentence length on
quality-of-life offenses to time-served or its near equivalent. Conversely,
they believe they achieve something substantial: the preservation of
communal perceptions of legitimacy while enabling heavy-handed (but
tactically-useful) policing. Prosecutors know that even though minority
communities may never wholly embrace summary arrests for marginal
crimes—especially when white members of affluent communities face no
similar enforcement policies—these communities will be more willing to at
least abide mass arrests if plea prices stay low.
My project here is almost entirely descriptive. I make no welltheorized normative claim about grassroots plea bargaining. I do not even
claim that prosecutors who are influenced by it in fact manage to achieve
their ends. I simply assert that prosecutors are influenced by it—that
grassroots plea bargaining is a genuine plea-bargaining pressure. To test
my thesis, I use New York City as a backdrop. I do this for three reasons:
First, New York City whole-heartedly adopted a particularly vigorous
brand of order-maintenance policing in the 1990s.17 Second, unlike police
forces in other cities, the NYPD did very little to solicit the collaboration
of affected communities.18 Third, generally speaking, there is a startling
dearth of data on misdemeanor case processing.19 New York City,
however, is something of an exception. Specifically, the city’s Criminal
Justice Agency conducted a fairly thorough study comparing misdemeanor
enforcement for the years 1989 and 1998.20 The first period precedes the
Violations—for example public consumption of alcohol or disorderly conduct—are not
crimes but may carry small penalties like fines, community service, or a few days jail.
17 See generally Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance
Policing New York Style, 97 Mich. L. Rev. 291 (1998).
18 See Philip B. Heymann, The New Policing, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 407, 422-40 (2000)
(comparing New York City’s model of order-maintenance policing with the Boston and
Chicago models); see also infra Part I.B.
19 See Ed A. Munoz & Stephen J. Sapp, Racial/Ethnic Misdemeanor Sentencing
Disparities: Additional Evidence for Contextual Discrimination, 1 J. ETHNICITY CRIM.
JUST. 27, 29 (2003) (“The deficiency in knowledge surrounding the adjudication of
misdemeanor crimes is somewhat surprising considering they are the most common
types of offenses for which people are detained, interrogated, arrested and convicted.”);
Michael J. Lieber & Anita N. Blowers, Race and Misdemeanor Sentencing, 14 CRIM.
JUST. POL’Y REV. 464, 469 (2003) (“Only a few comprehensive studies of misdemeanor
sentence outcomes exist.”); cf. James Nelson, A Dollar or a Day: Sentencing
Misdemeanants in New York State, 2 J. RES. CRIM. & DELINQ. 183, 183 (1994) (“Most
studies of racial disparities in case processing decisions have focused on sentencing
decisions for persons convicted of serious crimes.”).
20 The study’s findings are collected in three separate documents, all available at
www.nycja.org/research/research.htm. NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY,
RESEARCH BRIEF: THE IMPACT OF QUALITY OF LIFE POLICING (2003) [hereinafter, CJA,
16
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city’s implementation of order-maintenance policing; the second period
coincides with it.
Even with this, however, my analysis remains somewhat
incomplete. Indeed, the data I offer as consistent with grassroots plea
bargaining may be consistent also (at least partially) with other oftrecognized plea-bargaining influences, most significantly heavy caseload.
Consequently, the aim of my project is to show only that grassroots plea
bargaining is a plausible influence that further obscures law’s shadow. In
short, I open the discussion, but I leave to the econometricians the
significant task of definitively measuring the impact of grassroots plea
bargaining—if that is even possible. After all, it may be that the wide
range of distinct influences on real-world bargaining is unknowable and
the strength of any isolated identified influence “unquantifiable.”21 But
even if grassroots plea bargaining is ultimately immeasurable with
precision, it remains worthwhile to recognize it as another pressure
point—an additional ingredient in the mix.
The project has three parts. In Part I, I draw on social-norms
theories that explore the importance of communal perceptions of law’s
legitimacy. I then illustrate how New York City’s initial adoption of
“broken-windows” discretion soon became a policy that more closely
approximated zero tolerance. In Part II, I describe prosecutorial biases
that favor the charging of defendants in public-order cases. However, I
also provide data that show that in New York City in the 1990s these
same defendants—once charged—typically received increasingly lenient
plea bargains. I then provide reasons why conventional explanations may
fail to account wholly for this leniency trend. Finally, in Part III, I attempt
to demonstrate that grassroots plea bargaining is a genuine force that
exerts downward pressure on plea prices, at least in the context of ordermaintenance policing.
I. ORDER-MAINTENANCE POLICING & PERCEPTIONS OF LEGITIMACY
To properly comprehend the reasons for grassroots plea bargaining
and the influence it had on plea prices in New York City, two first-order
aspects of order-maintenance policing must be understood: first, the
RESEARCH BRIEF]; NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY, TRENDS IN CASE AND
DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING AND OUTCOMES, IN
NON-FELONY ARRESTS PROSECUTED IN NEW YORK CITY’S CRIMINAL COURTS 39 (2002),
[hereinafter CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS]; NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY,
TRENDS IN CASE AND DEFENDANT CHARACTERISTICS, AND CRIMINAL COURT PROCESSING
AND OUTCOMES, OF PROSECUTED ARRESTS FOR MISDEMEANOR AND LESSER-SEVERITY
OFFENSES IN NEW YORK CITY (2002) [hereinafter CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS].
21 Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 139, 171
(2005).
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degree to which normative crime control turns on public perceptions of the
legitimacy of law; and second, the way in which order-maintenance
policing in New York City transformed from a policy of discretionary
enforcement into one of zero tolerance.
A.

Legitimacy

Normative crime control ultimately depends on “bring[ing] the
potential offender to see prohibited conduct as unattractive because it is
inconsistent with the norms of family, friends, or—perhaps most
importantly—the individual’s own internalized sense of what is
acceptable.”22 The law’s “normative punch” is weakened when
communities identify with criminals over the police and view enforcement
as “oppressive and discriminatory,” rather than “stigmatizing.”23 When
the public begins to side with criminals over police, deterrence and
voluntary compliance with law are undermined: “Crimes become selfdefeating. . . . [The] criminal law generates its own opposition and
resistance.”24
22 Paul H. Robinson, Why Does the Criminal Law Care What the Layperson Thinks Is
Just? Coercive Versus Normative Crime Control, 86 VA. L. REV. 1839, 1840, 1861 (2000)
(“The criminal law cares about layperson’s intuitions of justice because their
incorporation is essential to normative crime control. . . . [P]eople obey law because they
fear the disapproval of their social group if they violate law.”); see generally TOM R.
TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 31-37, 64-69, 161-62 (1990) (“[S]tudies suggest that
those who view authority as legitimate are more likely to comply with legal authority,
whether the legitimacy is expressed as obligation or as support.”).
23 Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1872, 1877 (“If the law strays too far from the norms, the
public will not respect the law, and hence will not stigmatize those who violate it. Loss of
stigma means loss of the most important deterrent the criminal justice system has.”); see
also Robinson, supra note 22, at 1841 (2000) (“Effective normative crime control requires
a criminal law that has moral credibility within the community it governs.”); see
generally, Jeffrey Fagan, Valerie West & Jan Holland, Neighborhood, Crime, and
Incarceration in New York City, 36 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 71, 73 (2004).
24 William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1800 (1998); see
also, George Akerlof & Janet L. Yellen, Gang Behavior, Law Enforcement, and
Community Values, VALUES AND PUBLIC POLICY 191 (Henry J. Aaron et al., ed. 1994)
(noting that using “bricks and sticks” to enforce crime in ways that communities find
unfair “may be self-defeating”); Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Policing Guns: Order
Maintenance and Crime Control in New York, GUNS, CRIME, AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA 210 (Bernard E. Harcourt, ed. 2003) (arguing that many minority communities
suffer “stigma saturation” and consequently “legal control engenders resistance . . . the
opportunity to leverage formal social control into informal social control is lost”); see
generally Tracey Meares, Dan Kahan & Neil Katyal, Updating the Study of Punishment,
56 STAN. L. REV. 1171 (2004); Dan Kahan, Between Economics and Sociology: The New
Path of Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477 (1997); Dan Kahan, Social Influence, Social
Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. REV. 349 (1997).
This observation that enforcement practices may prove self-defeating is as true of
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This legitimacy problem is especially acute in the petty-crime
context, because these offenses proscribe conduct that is not intuitively
criminal. All right-minded people know that robbery, rape, and murder
are wrong;25 but reasonable minds may disagree about “borderline”
crimes, like aggressive panhandling, public urination, or even simple drug
possession.26 This is not to say that law-abiding members of minority
communities crave public disorder—just the opposite.27 But, for them,
“quality of life” is a more nuanced concept: it may be affected negatively
not only by disorder, but also by the police charged with rooting it out.28
Police and prosecutors who respond too stridently to “borderline” behavior
(that is more annoying than anything else) run the risk of producing
sympathy for the rule breakers.29 Under certain enforcement conditions,
suspects of petty crime can become the perceived victims of police
aggression. And police become agents of oppression—the “occupying
force.”30
foreign affairs as it is of criminal law. See, e.g., JULIA E. SWEIG, FRIENDLY FIRE: LOSING
FRIENDS AND MAKING ENEMIES IN THE ANTI-AMERICAN CENTURY (2006); Dana Priest and
Josh White, War Helps Recruit Terrorists, Hill Told: Intelligence Officials Talk Of
Growing Insurgency, WASH. POST, Feb. 17, 2005, A1.
25 See Stuntz, supra note 24, at 1800 (“[A]s a matter of common sense, the law’s moral
credibility is not needed to tell a person that murder, rape, and robbery is wrong.”);
Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1871 (“The mass of the population avoids seriously bad behavior
not because they know it can be found in the codes, but because they know the behavior
is thought to be seriously bad.”).
26 See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1894 (“The more ‘crime’ includes things that only a slight
majority of the population thinks is bad, the harder it is to sell the idea that ‘criminal’ is
a label that only attaches to very bad people.”); see also Robinson, supra note 22, at 1865
n.84.
27 Robert C. Ellickson, Controlling Chronic Misconduct in City Spaces: Of Panhandlers,
Skid Rows, and Public-Space Zoning, 105 Yale L.J. 1165, 1167-68, 1182 (1996) (noting
that black politicians in Washington, D.C. and Atlanta embraced anti-panhandling
measures); infra note 34 and accompanying text.
28 See Tracey L. Meares, Charting Race and Class Differences in Attitudes Toward
Drug Legalization and Law Enforcement: Lessons for Federal Criminal Law, 1 BUFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 137, 138-46 (1997) (discussing “dual frustration” in minority communities
that “uniquely experience problems” associated with both crime and criminal
enforcement). For me, the reggae classic Police and Thieves captures this conflicted
thinking perfectly. JUNIOR MURVIN & LEE “SCRATCH” PERRY, Police and Thieves, on
POLICE AND THIEVES (Mango 1977) (“Police and thieves in the street. . . . Scaring the
nation with their guns and ammunition. . . . All the crimes committed day by day. . . All
the peacemakers turn war officers.”).
29 See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text; cf. Robinson, supra note 22, at 1866
(noting that criminal law generally does not and ought not punish behaviors that are
simply “annoying to some people”).
30 Erik Luna, Race, Crime, and Institutional Design, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 183,
185 (2003). Thus, African-Americans are several times more likely to have a low or very
low opinion of the honesty and ethical standards of police. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS ONLINE,
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This tenuous balance underscores seemingly conflicting findings
that show great fear of crime in minority communities31 but concurrent
aversion to tough-on-crime measures.32 On the one hand, members of
minority communities are the most likely crime victims, and therefore
have greater stake in effective enforcement.33 Indeed, they are frequently
among the vanguard pushing for increased attention to unaddressed
crime problems.34 On the other hand, these same community members
recognize that although the criminal element may be a scourge on the
community, it is still a part of the community—whereas the police
typically are not. Accordingly, the crime victims and the perpetrators
cannot help but keep strong ties: they share “linked fate[s].”35 Ultimately,
tbl.221 (2003), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook. And they are almost three
times more likely to have very little confidence in the police and to see police brutality as
an issue in their communities. Id. at tbls.212,20002.
31 African-Americans are more afraid than whites to walk alone in their own
neighborhoods. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 130-31 (2003) [hereinafter, SOURCEBOOK].
They worry more about every category of crime than whites. Id. at 132. They are more
than twice as likely to fear being murdered. Id. They are far more likely to believe the
crime rate is rising. Id. at 128. They are consistently more likely to report that society
spends too little on crime. Id. at 134-35. And they are more likely to favor criminalization
of drugs. Id. at 140-41; see also Meares, supra note 28, at 145-47.
32 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 31, at 158-59 (finding that African-Americans are two to
three times more likely to conclude that courts treat criminals too harshly); see also
Meares, supra note 28, at 145-47; Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of
Antiquated Procedural Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. CHI. L. F.
197, 208-10 (1998); see generally Lawrence D. Bobo & Devon Johnson, A Taste for
Punishment: Black and White Americans’ Views on the Death Penalty and the War on
Drugs, 1 DU BOIS REV. 151, 156-57 (2004).
33 Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 208.
34 Id. at 210; Randall Kennedy, The State, Criminal Law, and Racial Discrimination: A
Comment, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1255, 1255 (1994); Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1190.
35 Tracey L. Meares, It’s a Question of Connections, 31 VAL. U.L. REV. 579, 588-89
(1997); accord Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 210 (“Inner-city teens and even gang
members are linked to the majority by strong social and familial ties. . . . [T]he
troublemakers are native.”); Jody David Armour, Bring the Noise, 40 B.C. L. REV. 733,
735 (1999) (noting “deep sense of connectedness and sympathy that law-abiding blacks
feel toward their wayward sons and daughters, brothers and sisters, fathers and
mothers, friends and cousins, as well as toward blacks they don’t know personally but
with whom they share a common plight”); Meares, supra note 28, at 160 (“The young
black men wreaking havoc are still ‘our youngsters’ in the eyes of many of the decent
poor and working-class people who are sometimes their victims.” (quoting Glenn C.
Loury)). As critics of the incarceration boom make plain, whole communities suffer when
large segments are warehoused in prisons. Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury
Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677, 690-91,
695 & nn.73-74 (1996) (“These costs . . . include the perceived dearth of men ‘eligible’ for
marriage, the large percentage of black children who live in female-headed households,
the lack of male ‘role models’ for black children . . . , the absence of wealth in the black
community, and the large unemployment rate among black men.”); see generally BRUCE
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the community probably favors some sanctions for the disorderly, but
within narrow bounds.36 When the police overstep these bounds, it is not
the disorder but the police themselves that become principal foci of
community ire.37 Law-abiding citizens come to fear and loathe “borderline”
crime far less than order-maintenance policing.38
B.

Zero Tolerance

In 1982, James Q. Wilson and George Kelling wrote a seminal essay
introducing the “broken windows” theory of deterrence.39 Wilson and
Kelling argued that public disorder left unchecked breeds more serious
crime.40 In the early 1990s, New York City embraced the idea,
implementing broad strategies that targeted low-level offenses like public
urination, drinking, and pot smoking; graffiti; turnstile hopping; and
aggressive panhandling.41 In its initial incarnation, proponents of the
broken-windows theory generally (and the New York City approach
specifically) believed that the policy worked best by decentralizing police
response to public disorder to thereby increase enforcement flexibility and
effectiveness.42 Implementation turned on providing police ample
discretion: they could make arrests for public-order offenses, or they could
give tickets or warnings, or they could do something else all together, or
WESTERN, PUNISHMENT AND INEQUALITY IN AMERICA (2006); Dorothy E. Roberts, The
Social and Moral Cost of Mass Incarceration in African American Communities, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 1271 (2004).
36 As Tracey Meares explained, “[W]hen there is mutual support between . . . lawabiders and lawbreakers, it may be difficult to draw lines between them by penalizing
lawbreakers very harshly for nonviolent offenses.” Meares, supra note 35, at 589. This is
a main reason that Meares and Kahan favor gang-loitering ordinances:
[M]inority residents of high crime communities do not desire to cut themselves
off entirely from those against whom the gang loitering law was enforced. In fact,
it may be precisely because they care so deeply about these persons that
residents of the inner-city prefer relatively mild gang loitering and curfew laws
over draconian . . . measures. Inner-city residents may believe these harsher
penalties visit an intolerably destructive toll on the community as a whole.
Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 210; see also Stuntz, supra note 24, at 1837.
See Meares, supra note 35, at 588.
38 See Butler, supra note 35, at 691 n.76 (noting that Henry Louis Gates and Wynton
Marsalis both report the criminal justice system as their “worst fear”).
39 James Q. Wilson & George L. Kelling, Broken Windows, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1982, at 24.
40 Id.
41 See Harcourt, supra note 17, at 292.
42 See Steven Zeidman, Policing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution,
32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 317 (2004); Jeffrey Rosen, Excessive Force—Why Patrick
Dorismond Didn’t Have to Die¸ NEW REPUBLIC, Apr. 10, 2000.
37
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they could do nothing at all.43 But in New York City the approach
“morphed” overtime into a perhaps initially unintended policy of zero
tolerance.44
What heralded this change was recognition at the NYPD’s highest
levels that summary arrests conferred greater benefits than tickets and
warnings.45 First, the NYPD often found contraband and other evidence of
more serious crime when it stopped and searched suspects for petty
offenses.46 Second, the arrestees sometimes had open warrants that were
discovered only in processing the arrests.47 Third, the NYPD used arrests
to collect fingerprints and other pedigree information that proved
beneficial to future criminal investigations.48 Concurrently, the NYPD
relied on new data-basing technology and other innovations that made
feasible the efficient processing of mass arrests.49 For example, then-police
commissioner Bill Bratton put to work a “Bust Bus”—a city bus retrofitted
into an on-the-spot arrest-processing center.50

See Wilson & Kelling, supra note 39, at 24; Rosen, supra note 42, at 24-25.
See Rosen, supra note 42, at 24-25 (quoting George Kelling: “’Zero tolerance’ is a
phrase I never used, never have used.”); see also Tim Newburn and Trevor Jones,
Symbolizing Crime Control: Reflections on Zero Tolerance, 11 Theoretical Criminology
221 (2007) (“Although . . . the main players in the New York policing story distanced
themselves from the term Zero Tolerance, it became inextricably associated with the
policing approaches developed under [Police Commissioner] Bill Bratton.”). Conversely,
Bernard Harcourt stresses that order-maintenance policing in New York City was zero
tolerance all along. BERNARD E. HARCOURT, ILLUSION OF ORDER: THE FALSE PROMISE OF
BROKEN WINDOWS POLICING 50 & 252 n.3 (2001) (“[The] approach was, from its inception,
a zero-tolerance approach. . . . It was about sweeps . . . not an exercise in police
discretion.”).
45 See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 50 & 252 n.3 (“Bratton and Giuliani understood
from the beginning the close relationship between order maintenance, sweeps, and
catching criminals.”); Zeidman, supra note 42, at 317; Rosen, supra note 42, at 24-26.
46 See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48; Rosen, supra note 42, at 24 (“[P]olice stop, frisk,
and arrest vast numbers of young black and Hispanic men for minor offenses, in the
hopes that turnstile jumpers and pot smokers may also be guilty of more serious
offenses.”).
47 See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48; Rosen, supra note 42, at 24 (noting that one in
seven of those arrested for hopping turnstiles had outstanding warrants).
48 See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48; Rosen, supra note 42, at 25 (describing account
of violent-crime defendant who was arrested based on fingerprints that were collected
pursuant to earlier subway-hop arrest).
49 See CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 32 (noting that technological
developments made “possible, among other things, faster pre-arraignment processing of
defendants . . . [and the implementation of] more restrictive [arrest] policies”); see also
HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48; Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken
Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457, 458-63 (2000) (describing New York City’s “sophisticated data-driven . . . system—
Compstat”); Newburn & Jones, supra note 44, at 226 (same).
50 HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48.
43
44
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Public-order policing, thus, became no mere end in itself but an
investigatory means—less of a social problem and more of a policing
“opportunity.”51 As Jeffrey Rosen put it: “Instead of prosecuting lowerlevel offenses to encourage an atmosphere of social order that would
prevent more serious crime, [authorities] began prosecuting lower-level
offenses in order to catch more serious criminals.”52 Commissioner
Bratton, himself, gleefully recounted: “Every arrest was like opening a box
of Cracker Jack. What kind of toy am I going to get? Got a gun? Got a
knife? Got a warrant? . . . It was exhilarating for the cops.”53
Unsurprisingly, the NYPD’s upper ranks turned up the pressure on beat
officers to satisfy higher arrest quotas.54
The end result was a wide police net that captured an
extraordinarily broad cross-section of citizens.55 In the 1990s, the city
witnessed a rise in the arrest and prosecution rates of both older
defendants and younger defendants (many of whom had no criminal
Rosen, supra note 42, at 24, 26.
Id. at 24, 26 (“Zero tolerance focuses not on deterring crime but on discovering it.”
(emphasis in original)); see also Zeidman, supra note 42, at 317 (“No longer were the
police targeting low-level offenses to restore social order; instead their modus operandi
wass to catch more serious criminals. The motivation to arrest even more people grew
accordingly.”).
Recent attention to the NYPD’s “Operation Lucky Bag,” illustrates this point. Under
the sting operation, police leave unattended bags on subway platforms, and arrest
commuters who take them. Editorial, Manufacturing Misdemeanors, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6,
2007; Dan Mangan, NYC Operation “Lucky Bag” Draws Controversy, N.Y. POST, Feb. 27,
2007; Police Sting Operation Lucky Bag Has Some Calling Entrapment, N.Y.1, Mar. 1,
2007, available at http://ny1news.com/ny1/content/index.jsp?stid=6&aid=67233. The
operation has been called everything from entrapment to a colossal waste of resources.
True, the operation may be shaky normatively and legally, but it is not wasteful. It gives
the NYPD opportunities to make arrests, and these arrests alone have value. Indeed, the
NYPD has offered precisely this defense of the operation, stressing the operation’s
success in netting career criminals. Mangan, supra. In short, police create disorder to
police disorder—not as a futile exercise or as a mere mechanism to bolster arrest
numbers, but because policing disorder is itself advantageous.
53 HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 10; see also id. at 100-02.
54 See HARCOURT, supra note 44, at 48, 176 (noting that Bratton directed his force to
stop issuing desk-appearance tickets in lieu of formal arrests); Newburn & Jones, supra
note 44, at 226 (“Bill Bratton described the twice-weekly Compstat meetings as
requiring precinct commanders ‘to be ready to review their up-to-date computergenerated crime statistics and relate what things are going to be done to achieve crime
reduction.’”); see also CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 32, 39 (finding that
summary arrests for minor offenses shifted throughout the 1990s from “innovation” to
“norm”); see generally, Fagan et al., supra note 23, at 80 (describing NYPD programs
designed to generate high rates of drug arrests).
55 CJA RESEARCH BRIEF, supra note 20, at 7 (“[T]hese [police] tactics have swept into
the criminal courts large numbers of older, chronic offenders, and young people . . . often
from minority communities and without adult criminal records, arrested for low-level
drug offenses.”).
51
52
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records). Specifically, from 1989 to 1998, the rates of non-felony cases
against defendants aged sixteen to twenty and defendants aged over forty
approximately doubled.56 The total number of non-felony cases against all
defendants without records rose by 233%.57
Tbl.1. Non-Felony Prosecutions of Older, Younger, and Clean-Record Defendants

1989

1998

Rate of Non-Felony Cases
Against Defendants Age 16-20
(total number)

9.2% (7,964)

19% (33,461)

Rate of Non-Felony Cases
Against Defendants Age 41+
(total number)

10.3% (8,954)

20.4% (35,915)

Rate of Non-Felony Cases
Against Defendants Without
Records (total number)

49.4% (38,160)

54.1% (89,132)

*Source: NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY

Significantly, however, these enforcement policies were zero
tolerance in certain communities only. Conversely, predominately white
and affluent neighborhoods were left largely unaffected.58 In fact, in 1998,
the rate of non-felony prosecutions against whites was almost a third
lower than in 1989.59 In short, as police ramped up to zero tolerance, they
paid less attention to white New Yorkers who were committing petty
offenses. Accordingly, in a densely populated metropolis such as New York
City, law-abiding community members in the affected communities could
readily bear witness to what police were doing in the immediate
56 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at fig.3a; see also infra tbl.1. Similarly, the
rate of cases against defendants aged 16-20 with no prior convictions more than doubled.
CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.11.
57 Id.
58 Zeidman, supra note 42, at 318; see also CIVILIAN COMPLAINT REVIEW BOARD, STREET
STOP ENCOUNTER REPORT: AN ANALYSIS OF CCRB COMPLAINTS RESULTING FROM THE
NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT’S “STOP & FRISK” PRACTICES, June 2001, at 1, available
at http://www.nyc.gov/html/ccrb/pdf/stop.pdf; Zeidman, supra note 42, at 318 (noting that
minorities disproportionately bore the brunt of proliferation of stop-and-frisk practices);
Jeffrey Fagan, Race, Legitimacy, and Criminal Law, 4 SOULS 69, 70 (2002) (“Under the
recent policies of the New York City Police Department, aggressive stops and searches
have been disproportionately aimed at nonwhite citizens, far outpacing their actual
involvement in crime.”); Fagan & Davies, supra note 49, at 458-63; see generally Fagan et
al., supra note 23, at 74 (“[T] he overall excess of incarceration rates over crime rates
seems to be concentrated among non-white males living in [New York] City’s poorest
neighborhoods.”).
59 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at fig.3a.
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neighborhoods—but not the more-affluent and whiter ones nearby.
The fallout of such highly localized enforcement was the
disintegration of norms against “borderline” conduct. Community
members came to feel that certain behavior—for instance, wandering
uninvited into building lobbies—was proscribed only for them.60
Consequently, anti-crime norms shifted perceptibly against the police and
in favor of the perceived-aggrieved petty criminals.61 Law-abiding
community members saw the police stop, search, and arrest great
numbers of their acquaintances, friends, and relatives (most notably their
children).62 Many of the law-abiding community members even
experienced enforcement firsthand because less-discriminate policing
Unsurprisingly,
practices led invariably to higher error rates.63

60 Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1880 (emphasis in original); see also Stuntz, supra note 24,
at 1800 (“[T]he message becomes: the behavior is bad when people in that neighborhood
do it. . . . That is not a message likely to have normative force for those who are
targets.”); see also Fagan, supra note 59, at 462 (“[W]hat was constructed as ‘ordermaintenance policing’ . . . was widely perceived among minority citizens as racial
policing, or racial profiling.”). On such matters, hip-hop lyrics can provide a salient and
under-emphasized snapshot of inner-city perspective. See, e.g., TALIB KWELI, Protective
Custody,
lyrics
available
at
http://www.lyricsmania.com/lyrics/talib_kweli_lyrics_4001/lyrics_11903/protective_custod
y_lyrics_138148.html (“Justice? All I see is ‘Just Us’ gettin’ knocked, locked, and bust.”);
see generally Paul Butler, Much Respect: Toward a Hip-Hop Theory of Punishment, 56
STAN. L. REV. 983 (2004).
61 See Rosen, supra note 42, at 24 (“Zero tolerance has undermined the popular support
upon which effective crime-fighting ultimately relies.”); see, e.g., Brand Nubian, Probable
Cause, on FOUNDATION (Arista Records 1998) (“They say protect and serve and never
give the people the respect they deserve, as if they wasn’t equal. These is man-made
laws, selectively applied. . . . Now Giuliani wanna talk about the Quality of Life. Think
he got the right to follow me at night. . . . You don't have to break no laws. They say
probable cause.”).
62 As the criminal justice agency noted, early city-generated policy papers that
trumpeted the virtues of broken-windows enforcement had failed to foresee the great
increases in arrest and prosecution of the young, and accordingly under-estimated public
dissatisfaction with the policy. Id. at 38.
63 See Stunz, supra note 24, at 1821 (“But there are other costs to these tactics, costs
borne not by police officers but by innocent citizens of the targeted neighborhoods. Large
numbers of street stops based on fairly casual cues mean large numbers of bad stops as
well as good one.”); see generally Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 24, at 194 (“There is thus
the possibility that inner-city neighborhoods may be caught in a crime-ridden
equilibrium in which the innocent are punished along with the guilty, and, because this
occurs, the community resents and frustrates the police.”); JEROME H. SKOLNICK,
JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY 218 (1966) (“If an
honest citizen resides in a neighborhood heavily populated by criminals, just as the
chances are high that he might be one, so too are the chances high that he might be
mistaken for one.”); Bowers, supra note 2, at Part I; see, e.g., Zeidman, supra note 42, at
343 (discussing an informal poll revealing that with few exceptions residents in these
communities reported being subjected to street searches)..
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complaints about police brutality skyrocketed as vigorous enforcement
continued to place strain on already-fragile police-community relations.64
Ultimately, people in the target neighborhoods came to see arrests as
more of an affliction that unfortunate community members “caught” than
as deserved state response to justifiably unlawful conduct.65
II. MORE CHARGES, LESS PUNISHMENT
Zero tolerance may describe criminal enforcement along any of
three principal axes: the degrees to which (i) police make arrests, (ii)
prosecutors levy charges, or (iii) prosecutors maximize conviction
sentences. As indicated, the NYPD tried to maximize arrests under the
guise of order-maintenance policing. Prosecutors, however, took a more
nuanced approach. They levied charges with increasing frequency but
concurrently offered progressively more lenient bargains.
A.

Charging Frequency & Dismissal Aversion

Generally speaking, prosecutors possess a strong predilection in
favor of levying and keeping charges—essentially, a mindset of “nondefeat.”66 To some degree this is a product of an engrained prosecutorial
“presumption of guilt.”67 More significantly, in the context of order-

64 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 38 (“[C]ommunity relations, which
supposedly should have been improved by police efforts to restore order and civility in
neighborhoods, have lagged far behind the achievement of order maintenance goals.”); see
also Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows Policing and
Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 2 (forthcoming 2007), available at
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html; CCRB REPORT, supra note 58, at 1;
Zeidman, supra note 42, at 318.
65 See Butler, supra note 60, at 998 (quoting common hip-hop refrain: to “catch a case”);
cf. Big-L, Ebonics, on THE BIG PICTURE (Rawkus 2000) (“If you caught a felony you
caught an ‘F’.”).
66 Skolnick, supra note 67, at 57 (“In the county studied, the prosecutor’s office cared
less about winning than about not losing. The norm is so intrinsic. . . . It cannot be
attributed to such a simple and obvious fact as the periodic requirement of reelection.
Indeed, reelection seemed to be taken for granted.” (emphasis in original)); accord Bibas,
supra note 1, at 2472 (2004) (“[Prosecutors’] psychology of risk aversion and loss aversion
reinforces the structural incentives to ensure good statistics and avoid risking losses.”);
Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit
the Innocent, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1363 (1997); Alissa Pollitz Worden, Policymaking
by Prosecutors: The Uses of Discretion in Regulating Plea Bargaining, 73 JUDICATURE
335, 337 (1990) (“Conviction rates constitute simplistic but easily advertised indicators of
success since they appear to measure prosecutors’ ability to win cases.”).
67 HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 103; accord Daniel Givelber, Lost Innocence: Speculation
and Data About the Acquitted, 42 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1167, 1188 (2005); Andrew D.
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maintenance enforcement specifically, prosecutors make and follow
through with charges out of fealty to police.68 In these public-order cases,
police typically provide the entire impetus for arrests, because the arrests
are made on the basis of police observations, not crime reports.69
Therefore, prosecutors cannot decline to prosecute or dismiss public-order
offenses without at least implicitly rejecting police decisions. And such
rejection would reinforce the undesirable message that police are
unjustifiably targeting poor and minority citizens.70 Conversely, when
prosecutors process arrests that arise out of citizen crime reports, they can
elect not to charge or to dismiss for police-neutral reasons—for example,
that witnesses seem incredible or uncooperative. Indeed, studies have
found that witness non-cooperation is the leading cause of case dismissal
and no-charge decisions.71
This makes sense of otherwise seemingly curious data on charging
and dismissal rates in New York City in the 1990s. Specifically, the data
show, first, that non-felony charging rates rose and pre- and post-charge
dismissal rates fell, even as prosecutors were called upon to process more
than twice as many arrests—most of them for public-order “victimless”
offenses.72 Prosecutors charged more and dismissed less—even as they
wrestled with far higher caseloads—because they could; they did not need
Leipold, The Problem of the Innocent, Acquitted Defendant, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1297, 1328
(2000); Givelber, supra note 66, at 1363 (“Having made this decision [to charge], the
prosecutor will not retreat easily from it without securing something in return, such as a
plea.”); Jerome H. Skolnick, Social Control in the Adversary System, 11 J. CONFLICT
RESOL. 52, 62 (1967).
68 See George F. Cole, The Decision to Prosecute, ROUGH JUSTICE: PERSPECTIVES ON
LOWER CRIMINAL COURTS 127 (John A. Robertson ed. 1974) (“[T]he police . . . are
dependent upon the prosecutor to accept the output of their system; rejection of too many
cases can have serious repercussions affecting the morale, discipline, and workload of the
force.”); see also Leipold, supra note 67, at 1328; Givelber, supra note 67, at 1362; see,
e.g., Amy Waldman, Diallo Case Tests Bronx Prosecutor, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17, 1999, at
B1 (“For [prosecutors] good relations with the police are crucial . . . . District attorneys
know that if they are perceived as being unfair to the police, securing cooperation for
subsequent investigations . . . can be much harder.”).
69 See William J. Stuntz, Race, Class, and Drugs, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1795, 1819-21
(1998); see generally, Heymann, supra note 18, at 422-23 (describing differences between
reactive and preventative policing).
70 See supra Part I.B and notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
71 See e.g., HANS ZEISEL, THE LIMITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 26-28 (1982); see also
Donald A. Dripps, Miscarriages of Justice and the Constitution, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 635,
644-46 & nn.33,35 (1999).
72 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 12 & tbls.1,14. Specifically, in 1989,
there were 144,779 non-felony arrests and 86,822 non-felony arraigned cases, meaning
prosecutors charged in 60% of the cases. Id. at tbl.1. In 1998, there were 246,957 nonfelony arrests and 176,432 non-felony arraigned cases, meaning prosecutors charged in
71.4% of the cases. Id. Likewise, dismissals dropped during the same period, from 11.6%
to 8.9% of non-felony cases. Id. at tbl.14.
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lay-witnesses in order to push these victimless public-order cases forward.
In short, during the very period that police were arresting citizens en
masse, prosecutors were electing to accept police output with higher
frequency. The Giuliani administration instituted a policing policy of zero
tolerance, and prosecutors did more than just keep up.73
Second, the data demonstrate that non-felony harm-to-persons
cases in the second period were dismissed at a rate almost ten times
higher than the rate for non-felony drug cases and over twenty times
higher than the rate for fraud cases (a category principally comprised of
turnstile hops).74 At first blush, it seems odd that prosecutors would more
readily dismiss arguably violent cases with concrete victims. But that is
just the point: in those cases, prosecutors typically needed the victims (or
other lay witnesses) to cooperate. When prosecutors did not have such
cooperation, they had no choice but to dismiss; conversely, when
prosecutors could proceed, they did so.
Tbl.2. Non-Felony Arrest and Prosecution Rates

1989

1998

Total Non-Felony Arrests
(percentage increase in arrests)

144,779

246,957 (+71%)

Total Non-Felony Prosecutions
(percentage increase in
prosecutions)

86,822

176,432 (+103%)

Rate of Prosecuted Non-Felony
Arrests

60%

71.4%

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony
Cases

11.6%

8.9%

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony
Harm-to-Persons Cases

34%

37%

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony
Drug Cases

8.3%

3.9%

Rate of Dismissed Non-Felony
Fraud Cases

4.4%

1.5%

*Source: NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY

73 Cf. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbls.44B,E (finding that “the
actors and agencies operating within the Criminal Court function in a reactive manner,
responding to criminal justice policy decisions made outside of the court system but
which determine to a very great extent both the volume and nature of the caseloads of
the criminal courts”).
74 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.15.

17

JOSH BOWERS

B.

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

Leniency

When it came to plea bargaining, however, prosecutors did
something wholly different. Far from instituting a policy of zero tolerance,
prosecutors provided more and more lenient and summary offers of
adjournments in contemplation of dismissal (ACDs)75 or no-time pleas to
non-criminal violations—particularly to defendants without criminal
records.
First, with respect to charge reductions, far fewer criminal charges
remained misdemeanors for the purposes of disposition. Specifically, the
rate of ACDs rose from eleven to thirty percent of all non-felony cases.76
And, even for cases that resulted in some kind of conviction, the rate of
reduction to non-criminal violations rose from forty-four to fifty-two
percent of non-felony conviction cases.77 Admittedly, for recidivist
defendants, rates of ACDs and plea reductions to violations rose only
slightly: ACDs rose from four to nine percent of all non-felony cases and
plea reductions to violations rose from twenty-eight to thirty-two percent
of non-felony conviction cases.78 But for defendants with no criminal
record the rate of ACDs rose precipitously from nineteen to forty-seven
percent of all non-felony cases, and the rate of plea reductions to
violations rose from seventy-one to eighty-six percent of non-felony
conviction cases.79
Second, with respect to sentence type and length, fewer defendants
received any jail sentence in the second period. Jail sentences dropped
from a rate of fifty-eight to fifty percent of non-felony conviction cases.80
Again, recidivist defendants experienced only a slight decline (from sixtysix to sixty-two percent), while defendants with no criminal record enjoyed

75 Under the terms of an ACD, the case is pulled from the court calendar, but it
remains open for six or twelve months during which time the defendant must stay out of
trouble (and possibly meet other conditions). N.Y.C.P.L. §§ 170.55-56. If the defendant
complies with the terms of the ACD, her case is ultimately dismissed; if not, the case
may be restored to the calendar. Id. Some debate exists over whether ACDs are more
akin to dismissals or to adjudications of culpability. See JAMES F. NELSON, RACIAL AND
ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN PROCESSING PERSONS ARRESTED FOR MISDEMEANOR CRIMES: NEW
YORK STATE 1985-1986, at 19-20 (1991). Like Nelson, I believe that ACDs should be
“labeled culpable dispositions because they resemble conditional discharges and
probation sentences.” Id. (“It is hard to imagine when the court would prefer to dispose
an innocent defendant with an ACD rather than with a case dismissal.”).
76 CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.19.
77 Id. at tbl.17A.
78 Id. at tbls.17A,18,19,21 (combining all recidivist categories and A- and B-level
misdemeanors and calculating rate).
79 Id. at tbls.18,21 (combining A- and B-level misdemeanors and calculating rate).
80 CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at 37.
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the greatest drop (from forty-one to twenty-nine percent).81 More
significantly, there was a decline in sentence length from a mean of 39.1
to 19.9 days, and from a median of twenty to seven days.82 Put simply,
most jail sentences were more than halved (for the minority of defendants
who even received jail sentences). And the sentences fell for all types of
non-felony public-order offenses.83 Notably, the only two non-felony
offense categories that saw jail-sentence increases were sex and harm-topersons cases—respectively, a mean rise from 6.5 to 10.8 days and from
54.1 to 66.1 days.84 And these are the two categories of charges that fall
almost wholly outside the public-order umbrella.
Third, defendants had to wait less time to end their cases. New
York City has a well-established history of terminating the majority of its
non-felony cases at arraignments (a defendant’s first court appearance
that usually occurs less than twenty-four hours post-arrest).85 The 1990s
witnessed a rise even in this historically high arraignment-disposition
rate—from sixty-two to seventy-three percent.86 As several commentators
have noted, the process is often the principal punishment in many petty
cases; accordingly, quick dispositions may be tantamount to lenient
dispositions for the reason of speed alone.87

Id. at tbl.23 (combining all recidivist categories and calculating rate).
Id. at tbl.25. Unfortunately, the data do not delineate differences in jail-sentence
length between recidivist and clean-record defendants.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 See Ian Weinstein, The Adjudication of Minor Offenses in New York City, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1157, 1170 (2004).
86 Id. at tbl.43.
87 MILTON HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING 69-70 (1978) at 69-70 (“Contrary to what the
newcomer expects, defendants are often eager to plead guilty. . . . [T]hey contrast the
relative ease with which they can plead guilty with the costs in time and effort required
to fight a case.”); MALCOLM FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT 33, 277 (1979);
Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives
to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931, 952-55 (1983) (“For it is primarily
the process costs of misdemeanor justice that currently cause all but a small minority of
defendants to yield to conviction; these process costs are, in practice, more influential
than plea bargaining.”); Bowers, supra note 2, at Part II.
81
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Tbl.3. Snapshot of New York City Leniency Trend

1989

1998

Overall ACD Rate (all
prosecuted non-felony cases)

11%

30%

ACD Rate, Recidivist
Defendants

4%

9%

ACD Rate, Clean-Record
Defendants

19%

47%

Overall Rate of Plea Reductions
to Violations (all non-felony
conviction cases)

44%

52%

Rate of Plea Reductions to
Violations, Recidivist
Defendants

28%

32%

Rate of Plea Reductions to
Violations, Clean-Record
Defendants

71%

86%

Rate of Jail Sentences (all nonfelony conviction cases)

58%

50%

Rate of Jail Sentences,
Recidivist Defendants

66%

62%

Rate of Jail Sentences, CleanRecord Defendants

41%

29%

Jail Sentence Length (Mean)

39.1 days

19.9 day

Jail Sentence Length (Median)

20 days

7 days

Rate of Disposition at
Arraignments

62%

73%

*Source: NEW YORK CITY CRIMINAL JUSTICE AGENCY

Overall, then, New York City witnessed a fairly clear leniency
trend. But the trend did not extend citywide. Instead, leniency was most
apparent in those boroughs that were directly affected by public-order
policing.88 By contrast, Staten Island, which has the highest concentration
of white residents and white defendants, experienced the only overall jailsentence increases: the mean jail sentence rose from 20.4 to seventy-one
days and the median rose from ten to forty-five days.89 Additionally,

88
89

See infra notes 150-151 and accompanying text.
CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.47.
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Staten Island had the smallest percentage rise in ACDs.90 And it was the
only borough to experience a decrease—albeit slight—in the frequency of
cases disposed of at arraignments.91 Ultimately, Staten Island’s small
defendant population and distinctive sentencing practices92 caution
against reading too much into these data. But Staten Island does appear
to have been something of an outlier from the general leniency trend.
C.

Conventional Explanations

There are three chief conventional explanations that might underlie
this leniency trend in the second period: (1) resources were tighter, which
compelled over-burdened prosecutors to offer lower prices to ensure
quicker pleas;93 (2) the cases were sillier;94 and/or (3) the cases were
weaker.95 I cannot wholly refute any of these explanations. Each, no
doubt, played some part. Admittedly, there is a colorable argument that
these three explanations—taken together—account principally for the
leniency trend. But there are reasons—beyond my mere intuition—to
believe that these explanations fail to tell the whole story; that another
force was also at play.
i.

Resource Pressure

Overstretched resources are the weightiest conventional
explanation for the leniency trend. There are two broad categories of
Id. at tbl.43.
Id.
92 In 1998, Staten Island sentenced defendants to jail less frequently than it had in
1989 and less frequently than other boroughs in the latter period. Id. at tbls.45,48.
Accordingly, it could just be that Staten Island provided lengthier jail sentences for the
few defendants it sentenced to jail. In other words, it reserved incarceratory sentences
for only for those defendants who qualified for no other type of sanction and who merited
particularly harsh punishment.
93 See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971) (“If every criminal charge were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to
multiply by many times the number of judges and court facilities.”); UVILLER, supra note
15, at 180-81 (discussing influence of caseload on plea bargaining); see generally Peter
Nardulli, The Caseload Controversy and the Study of Criminal Courts, 70 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1979). But see FEELEY, supra note 87, at 5 (“[C]ase pressure appears to
have almost no effect on plea bargaining policies.”).
94 See Katherine J. Strandburg, Deterrence and the Conviction of Innocents, 35 CONN.
L. REV. 1321, 1336 (2003); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining as Disaster, 101 YALE
L.J. 1979, 2000 (1992).
95 HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 106 (discussing influence of case weakness on plea
bargaining) Bibas, supra note 1, at 2472 (noting potential for “irresistible offers in weak
cases”); ; Alschuler, supra note 10, at 59; Bowers, supra note 2, at Part IV.C.
90
91
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criminal justice resources: jailhouse resources and courthouse resources.
As to the first, jailhouse resources were under no greater stress in the
1990s. Indeed, New York City’s total jail inmate population fell by almost
10% from 1990 to 1999—notwithstanding substantial increases in arrests
and prosecutions.96
As to the second, courthouse resources admittedly were taxed far
more heavily in the latter period; accordingly, this pressure cannot be so
readily dismissed.97 Nevertheless, for two reasons, higher caseloads may
not have proven terrifically determinative. First, prosecutors charged
defendants more frequently and dismissed cases less frequently in the
second period.98 As noted, prosecutors did so because (from an evidentiary
standpoint) they typically needed only the word of police witnesses.99 But,
from a resource standpoint, it is significant that prosecutors remained
able to charge at higher rates—notwithstanding their markedly heavier
dockets. This increased charge rate would seem unexpected in a system
under debilitating resource strain.
Second, the data reveal marked variability in leniency growth
across categories of crime and record. Specifically, defendants without
criminal records and those facing public-order charges did far and away
the best. Conversely, recidivists enjoyed only marginal reductions in
sentence length and conviction charges.100 And jail sentences actually rose
dramatically for all categories of defendants in sex and harm-to-persons
cases.101 Of course, an argument could be made that prosecutors operating
under significant resource constraints would elect to direct the greatest
discounts precisely where they went: to those defendants for whom
prosecutors felt the most sympathy—those defendants without criminal
records facing non-violent charges. But this does not explain why
sentences increased in sex and harm-to-persons cases. (A system under
heavy strain would have kept these sentences level, at most.) In any
event, there is a countervailing argument that prosecutors under resource
pressure should rationally offer lenient (and therefore quickly
consummated) pleas in the other direction: to recidivist defendants in
more serious cases, because these cases present the greatest systemic
See Fagan et al., supra note 23, at 75.
See supra note 72; see also Mark Hamblett, Johnson Stays Focused on Job as
Prosecutor, N.Y.L.J. Feb. 1, 1999 (quoting Bronx District Attorney: “The system just
hasn’t expanded as it should. . . . We still don’t have anywhere near the judges we need
to handle the volume.”).
98 Supra notes 72-74, tbl.2 and accompanying text.
99 Supra note 74 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
101 See supra note 84 and accompanying text. Moreover, harm-to-persons cases saw a
decline in ACDs and a rise in convictions (whereas every other crime category, except
weapons cases, witnessed a rise in ACDs and a decline in convictions). Id. at tbl.15.
96
97
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burdens. Defendants in these cases are more likely to be detained
pretrial.102 Courts must provide caged buses and staffed cells to produce
them for court appearances. Therefore, courts least want to accommodate
repeat appearances for this most-costly defendant population.103
ii.

Case Seriousness

If case seriousness were a significant factor, again the study should
have made this plain when it controlled for crime category and record.
Presumably, defendants with like records who were charged with like
crimes should have done equally well in both periods. Yet, the data show
that the second-period defendants—with the same criminal records and
facing the same types of charges—were convicted and received jail
sentences less often, and received plea reductions more often.104 And, as
noted, the differences were greatest for defendants with no criminal
record.105
Admittedly, crime categories are just rough proxies for the actual
seriousness of discrete cases, but such coarse measures seem to be
sufficient in the context of public-order offenses. After all, while firstdegree robbery may encompass widely varying degrees of conduct,
turnstile hopping generally does not. It would be strange indeed to posit
that first-period defendants without criminal records somehow hopped
turnstiles or smoked marijuana far more seriously than similarly situated
defendants a decade later.106

See Bowers, supra note 2, at Parts II-III.
See id. Nor were these expensive defendant populations small. Recidivists made up
roughly half of criminal-court dockets in both periods. CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS,
supra note 20, at tbl.28. Harm-to-persons cases comprised approximately a tenth of all
cases in both periods. CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.3.
104 Id. at tbls.21-23.
105 Supra notes 79-81 and accompanying text; infra Part III.B (arguing that cleanrecord defendants are the expected principal beneficiaries of grassroots plea bargaining).
106 Of course, there are exceptions. For example, I represented a client in a
misdemeanor case of newsworthy silliness: selling flavored ices without a vendor’s
license on one of the hottest days of the year. See Sabrina Tavernise, Bronx Icy Vendor is
Put on Ice with a Wagonload of Legalese, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 2005, at A1. But such
notably silly cases are exceptions; roughly speaking, minor crimes seem to be of fairly
unitary degrees of seriousness. (Comparatively, a Columbia psychiatry professor
recently segregated different brands of killing into twenty-two categories that he ranked
on a “depravity scale” in order of evil. Adam Liptak, Adding Method to Judging
Mayhem, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2007.)
102
103
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Case Weakness

My argument against case weakness is more logical than analytical
or empirical. Case weakness is undoubtedly a significant factor in plea
pricing generally.107 However, it would not seem to play any great role in
public-order offenses. As noted, these cases typically arise wholly out of
police observation of concrete non-violent conduct.108 There is little in such
circumstances to signal case weakness to prosecutors at the time
prosecutors offer pleas. First, the police paperwork is skeletal. It usually
indicates only that, say, the officer observed the defendant hop a turnstile
or tag a wall with graffiti or enter without permission into a publichousing unit. And this police paperwork is generally all prosecutors have
to work off of when making plea offers at arraignments. Second, even if
the police paperwork were detailed, the paperwork would not likely record
accurately indicia of case weakness. As the Mollen Commission on Police
Corruption concluded, the NYPD in the 1990s suffered an epidemic of
police “falsifications,” which included the widespread “falsification of
police records, as when an officer falsifies the facts and circumstances of
an arrest in police reports.”109
Indeed, the fact that prosecutors charged a larger percentage of
defendants in the second period (when more arrests occurred solely on the
basis of police observations) indicates that prosecutors were prone to
accept police paperwork at face value.110 So, even where cases were weak,
prosecutors could not and would not comprehend such weakness.
III. GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING
If the conventional explanations do not account completely for the
leniency trend, then what does? Return for a moment to the question of
law’s legitimacy.
Wilson and Kelling might well have been right that petty crime
breeds violence and disorder. However, localized zero-tolerance policing
engendered oppression of other sorts: lives interrupted and social ties

See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
Supra notes 74, 99 and accompanying text.
109 COMMISSION TO INVESTIGATE ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE CORRUPTION AND THE ANTICORRUPTION PROCEDURES OF THE POLICE DEP’T, CITY OF NEW YORK, COMMISSION REPORT
1994, at 39, available at http://www.parc.info/reports/pdf/mollenreport.pdf [hereinafter
MOLLEN REPORT]; see also Zeidman, supra note 42, at 323-33. The Mollen Commission
called falsifications “the most common form of police corruption facing the criminal
justice system.” Id.
110 See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
107
108
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splintered.111 Just as order-maintenance policing rose to prominence on a
wave of “compassion fatigue” for the disorderly and the down and out,112
the potent police response risked its own backlash.113
Critically, police and prosecutors did not need to be social-norms
theorists to comprehend potential legitimacy problems. In New York City
in the 1990s, salient instances of police overreach—most notably the
highly publicized police shootings of unarmed civilians of African
descent—made audible to everyone the pitched uproar of certain
communities against zero-tolerance policing.114 More importantly,
institutional players found themselves in unique positions to intuit even
less-apparent communal disaffection. Police observed, understood, and
were affected by this growing estrangement most directly.115 But
prosecutors could discern it too. Generally speaking, prosecutors devote
substantial energy to securing community cooperation—cooperation with
investigations, evidence collection, and testimony; or just the willingness
of citizens to sit on grand and trial juries and indict or convict indictable
or convictable defendants.116 When cooperation is not forthcoming,

See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.
Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1167-68, 1218-19 (1996).
113 See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1875, 1891 (“Far from strengthening embattled norms,
criminalization is at least as likely to speed their unraveling.”); Fagan & Davies, supra
note 49; see also supra Part I.B.
114 See Fagan & Davies, supra note 49, at 462; see, e.g., Waldman, supra note 68 (“[I]t
would be difficult for Mr. Johnson, the only black district attorney in the state, to miss
the emotions swirling around the Diallo case. Protestors . . . rally outside the Bronx
County Courthouse almost daily.”).
115 See CJA, NON-FELONY TRENDS, supra note 20, at 39 (“The strained nature of policecommunity relations has been recognized by the NYPD leadership, which has been
developing since 1996 new initiatives to improve these relationships.”); see also Akerlof
& Yellen, supra note 24, at 174; Jason Sunshine & Tom. R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural
Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 L. & SOC’Y REV. 513
(2003). Indeed, in an effort to avoid further alienation of affected communities, thenNYPD commissioner Bill Bratton took pains to distance himself from the term “zero
tolerance”—a term most tough-on-crime advocates readily embrace. Newburn & Jones,
supra note 44, at 233, 235. Remarkably, Bratton insisted that zero tolerance adequately
described only the NYPD’s approach to police corruption. Id.
116 For example, Paul Butler, a former federal prosecutor, noted the widespread
understanding among urban prosecutors that they would lose many amply provable
cases “because some black jurors would refuse to convict black men who they knew were
guilty.” Butler, supra note 35, at 678. Indeed, the expression “Bronx Jury” has become
something of a term of art to capture the high rates of jury nullification in these
communities that harbor such profound and problematic systemic distrust. See
Waldman, supra note 68 (explaining that Bronx jurors “do not trust the police” and
consequently convict 5 to 15% less frequently than jurors in other parts of the city); see
also Butler, supra note 35, at 678-79; Nancy Marder, the Myth of the Nullifying Jury, 93
Nw. U.L. Rev. 877, 900-01 (1999); see generally Stuntz, supra note 24, at 1827 & n.77
(noting phenomenon of juror holdouts to avoid convicting African-American men, and
111
112
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prosecutors see it. They experience rising levels of disengagement
firsthand, and they quite obviously wish to minimize it, because growing
public disengagement makes criminal enforcement increasingly more
difficult.117
A.

Hedging against Anger

Dan Kahan has accurately described order-maintenance policing as
“a drug whose primary effect is that it will reduce crime, and its side effect
is that it may exacerbate political tensions.”118 Political tension
undermines political will. However, in this context, the requisite political
will is not of the garden-variety electoral breed. District attorneys are
elected, of course, but their fates do not usually rise and fall with their
handling of misdemeanor cases.119 In any event, the target communities of
public-order enforcement are not the kinds that typically wield terrific
electoral clout.120 The requisite political will is more of a functional means
to an end: it is the baseline level of public trust essential for effective
enforcement.121 This is what grassroots plea bargaining is all about, then.
noting anecdotally that most of these holdouts seem to be African-American women);
Kennedy, supra note 34, at 1257 n.21 (noting juror letter indicating that jury “didn’t
want to send anymore Young Black Men to Jail.”).
117 See Tom R. Tyler, the Role of Perceived Injustice in Defendants’ Evaluations of their
Courtroom Experience, 18 Law & Soc’y Rev. 51, 52 (1984) (“Because of their interest in
maintaining public support, legal authorities have been centrally concerned with
minimizing the hostility that . . . unsatisfactory government decisions might engender.”);
see also Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 24, at 196 (“[T]he traditional tools for crime
control—more police cars cruising the neighborhood and longer sentences—wrongly
applied, will be counterproductive because they undermine community norms for
cooperation with the police.”); Lawrence D. Bobo & Victor Thompson, Unfair by Design:
The War on Drugs, Race, and the Legitimacy of the Criminal Justice System, 73 SOC. RES.
445 (2006) (“[D]isillusionment is contributing to a crises of legitimacy, a crises that will . .
. undermine a readiness for positive engagement with the police and the court system.”);
Meares, supra note 35, at 589 (“The mutual distrust between African Americans and law
enforcement officers makes it less likely that African Americans will report crimes to the
police, assist the police in criminal investigations, and participate in community policing
programs that lead to greater social control of neighborhoods.”); Fagan, supra note 59, at
70 (“If you take away that legitimacy, you take away the incentives for people to interact
with the law.”); Luna, supra note 30, at 187 (noting “citizen reluctance to participate in
the criminal process as the legitimacy of law and its enforcers are undermined to the
point of irrelevance”); Fagan et al., supra note 23, at 73.
118 Rosen, supra note 42, at 27.
119 See Bowers, supra note 2, at Parts I.C., IV.A.
120 See generally Butler, supra note 35, at 710 (“[B]lacks are unable to achieve
substantial progress through regular electoral politics.”).
121 See Rosen, supra note 42, at 27 (“[E]ffective law enforcement officials must seek the
political support of the communities they serve.”). As Tom Tyler, a leading social-norms
thinker, observed, “[G]overnment authorities can only function effectively when citizens
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It is a prosecutorial tool to maximize political will for order-maintenance
policing (or, rather, to minimize the communal will to resist it).
In the 1990s, New York City prosecutors came to the fairly obvious
conclusion that zero-tolerance enforcement posed a legitimacy threat. As
Bronx District Attorney Robert T. Johnson explained: “Feelings of fear
and frustration abound. Troubling questions have been raised,
particularly in communities of color . . . regarding police/community
relations, civil liberties and the issue of respect. These questions must be
addressed.”122 But addressing these daunting questions directly and
thoroughly would have required substantial and fundamental reform, well
beyond the will or capacity of individual prosecution offices. Prosecutors,
however, had a readily available alternative identical to one exercised
frequently in the business sector to mollify dissatisfied customers—slash
prices. As anyone knows who has ever complained of, say, shoddy service
at a restaurant, the standard managerial response is complimentary
drinks or some other reduction of the bill. Free booze, of course, does not
address the underlying grievance. It might not even wholly assuage the
customer’s anger; but, then again, it might (as management is well
aware). At bottom, slashing prices is a comparatively easy and rational
quick-fix, because in the restaurant industry—like most all industries—
the loss of customer satisfaction is of far greater consequence than the loss
of a bit of merchandise.
Similarly, prosecutors do not highly value the commodity of
sentence length in petty cases.123 In the context of order-maintenance
policing, police and prosecutors have almost-fully extracted the soughtafter crime-fighting value via the already-consummated arrest.124
Thereafter, it makes eminent sense for prosecutors to give up sentence
length to foster an environment of cheap and quick pleas that allow for a
maximal number of police arrests with minimal opening for public
backlash. In any event, line prosecutors have no other systemic means to
buy satisfaction. As indicated, they cannot readily decline to prosecute or
dismiss cases.125 Thus, plea bargaining is the only mechanism generally
available to prosecutors to reshape criminal enforcement—and perhaps
public perceptions of it as well.126
support them enough to comply willingly with their directives.” Tyler, supra note 115, at
52-53.
122 The Diallo Shooting: Excerpts of Statement by District Attorney, N.Y. Times, April
1, 1999, at B5; see also Hamblett, supra note 97 (quoting Bronx District Attorney on
importance that community have “a sense that they are being heard”).
123 Bowers, supra note 2, at Part III (discussing prosecutorial unwillingness to
maximize plea prices, particularly in low-stakes cases).
124 See supra Part I.B.
125 See supra Part II.A.
126 The only other readily apparent option is community outreach to soften some of the
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This last point raises a first-order question that I have not fully
answered: Do defendant-favorable outcomes, in fact, positively impact
public perceptions of legitimacy? The brief answer is that the question is
beside the point.
Let me explain a bit further. Psychologist Tom Tyler has argued
forcefully against the conception that perceptions of legitimacy are
influenced by outcomes. Instead, Tyler has linked communal and
individual satisfaction wholly to procedural fairness.127 On that reading,
grassroots plea bargaining would seem to do nothing at all to promote
positive perceptions of legitimacy. After all, one can forcefully argue that
cursory plea bargaining is perhaps the least fair or deliberative process,
even if the resulting outcomes are defendant-favorable.128 One
counterargument, however, is that quick procedures may, in fact,
correlate well with fair procedures in these petty cases, because these are
the cases where defendants most want to just “get it over with.”129 In
other words, when the “process is the punishment,” the quickest process is
also the fairest.130
For present purposes, however, the better counterpoint is that the
debate does not matter. To demonstrate that grassroots plea bargaining is
a genuine influence, it is of no moment whether plea bargaining equates
with fair process or even whether Tyler is right that fair procedures are
the most accurate measure of defendant satisfaction. Instead, the entirely
descriptive question of whether grassroots plea bargaining is a real force
turns solely on prosecutors’ beliefs. If they believe that case outcome (not
process) is the best predictor of defendant satisfaction, then that is proof
enough of the existence of grassroots plea bargaining, because that belief
alone will motivate prosecutors to provide discounts. And even Tyler
would concede that prosecutors operate on such beliefs: “[A]ctors in the
hard feelings at the margins. See, e.g., Bronx County District Attorney’s Office Website,
available at http://www.bronxda.net/frames.html (providing details about Office’s
community outreach programs; Community Affairs Unit; and weekly television
program, “Ask the Bronx D.A.”); New York County District Attorney’s Office Website,
available at http://www.manhattanda.org/community/index.htm (providing details
about community outreach programs and Community Affairs Unit); cf. Waldman, supra
note 68 (describing Bronx District Attorney as engaging with community members and
attending “countless community events”).
127 TYLER, supra note 22, at 31-37, 64-69, 161-62; see also Tyler, supra note 117, at 53
(discussing the debate); Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 115. But see JONATHAN D. CASPER,
CRIMINAL COURTS: THE DEFENDANTS PERSPECTIVE 48-51 (1978) (correllating defendants’
perceptions of fairness principally with outcomes and finding greater levels of
satisfaction with pleas than trials).
128 Indeed, New York City defendants reported frustration with what they saw as “an
unending cycle of revolving-door justice.” CJA, Research Brief, supra note 20, at 7.
129 HEUMANN, supra note 8, at 69-70.
130 See supra notes 85-87 and accompanying text.
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legal arena have tended to . . . relate[] case outcomes to satisfaction.”131
Of course, even if prosecutors are right to think that defendantfavorable outcomes positively impact satisfaction, grassroots plea
bargaining would still seem to be an incomplete panacea for individual
and communal resentment that is aimed principally at a separate (albeitrelated) entity—the police. After all, ex post cheap pleas cannot wipe
wholly away the negative externalities of questionable police tactics and
arrests.132 In target communities, police end up arresting more people on
less evidence.133 And even though prosecutors are unaware which
defendants face weak, silly, or even baseless charges;134 the defendants,
themselves, do know. And their families and friends may know too. Those
who commit “borderline” conduct (or no unlawful conduct at all) are bound
to harbor some level of animosity even if they only had to spend a night in
jail. But, at bottom, a night is less than a week, and a week is less than a
month. The point is not that grassroots plea bargaining definitively
purchases satisfaction or wholly (or even partially) scrubs away
discontent—just that prosecutors rationally believe it might, and they act
upon that rational belief. They employ grassroots plea bargaining because
it is the most obvious and ready prosecutorial hedge against public anger.
This premise—that prosecutors game plea offers (at least implicitly)
to maintain an adequate baseline level of systemic support—provides an
interesting corollary to a similar dynamic identified by George Akerlof
and Janet Yellen.135 Akerlof and Yellen focused on a gang’s optimal level
of criminality. They hypothesized that a “cooperation/noncooperation”
boundary exists in all communities, below which law-abiding members
withhold necessary assistance from authorities.136 Accordingly, in
communities with high levels of systemic disaffection, gangs maximize
wealth by victimizing community members just up to this
“cooperation/noncooperation” boundary.137 “Any higher level of crime
would trigger the community’s cooperation, resulting in expected penalties
so great that crime would have a negative return. Any lower level of crime
is suboptimal.”138 Likewise, prosecutors use grassroots plea bargaining to
win the same leverage along the same axis—albeit in the opposite

Tyler, supra note 117, at 53, 56 (describing this as traditional view).
See generally, Sunshine & Tyler, supra note 115.
133 See supra notes 56-65 and accompanying text.
134 See supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
135 Akerlof & Yellen, supra note 24, at 175-187.
136 Id. at 187.
137 Id. at 184-86 (“The gang has an incentive to commit crime right up to the point
where people will cooperate with the police; but beyond that point, the community will
cooperate and crime will not pay.”).
138 Id.
131
132
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direction.139 Prosecutors lower prices to manipulate public goodwill—to
make sure that that sentiment stays just above the critical cooperation
boundary.140
Returning, then, to my client, Eddie Wise: operationally, it was of
little importance to police and prosecutors whether loitering for the
purposes of begging was a valid offense. (Indeed, if not for a few intrepid
lawyers, enforcement of the adjudicated-unconstitutional statute might
have continued unabated for years more.) All that mattered was keeping
communal approbation of police conduct and irritation with beggars
sufficiently strong. As long as that balance was achieved, police and
prosecutors could effectively enforce the ostensible law. Indeed, when the
unlawful loitering arrests and prosecutions came to light, the NYPD used
just this line of reasoning to defend its unlawful arrests: “The arrests were
made for conduct that certainly rose to the kind of aggressive, obnoxious
behavior that the NYPD is curbing.”141 In other words, the NYPD felt that
what mattered were not adverse judicial rulings of constitutional scope,
but a public willingness to see the behavior punished.
B.

Predicting Grassroots Plea Bargaining

Prosecutors need not give grassroots plea-bargaining discounts to
all defendants in all jurisdictions. Rather, it seems safe to assume that the
139 Cf. id. at 177 (“The most important constraint on the criminal activities of gangs
comes from the police power of the larger society outside its territory and the attitudes
of local residents toward cooperation with the police.”).
140 Indeed, Akerlof and Yellen seemed to implicitly recognize my premise. They
identified two systemic factors impacting community cooperation: “fairness of penalties”
and “attitudes toward police.” Id. at 184-85. The implication is that prosecutors may be
able to make up for police overreach by offering penalties that are seen as fairer. Id. at
189-90 (“[T]he optimal crime-fighting strategy does not call for punishments at infinitely
high level. . . . In many situations, the optimal punishment . . . is whatever penalty the
community considers fair.”).
A parallel also might be drawn between my theory of grassroots plea bargaining and a
separate theory recently proposed by Keith N. Hylton & V.S. Khanna in their article, A
Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure, 15 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 61 (2007). Hylton
and Khanna argued that defendant-friendly procedural protections serve to constrain
abusive prosecutorial rent-seeking. Id. Grassroots plea bargaining provides a similar
exogenous constraint—perhaps one that is all the more necessary in petty cases where
guilty pleas are the almost-exclusive mode of disposition and procedural protections are
consequently exercised infrequently and to no great effect. Cf. Louis Michael Seidman,
Criminal Procedure as the Servant of Politics, 12 CONST. COMMENT. 207 (1995) (arguing
that procedural protections are wholly ineffective, and, instead, that “constitutional
protections intended to make prosecution more difficult instead serve to make the
prosecutor’s job easier”).
141 Jego Armstrong, Chrisena Coleman & Robert Gearty, Beggar Sues Cops & Law Is
On His Side, DAILY NEWS, Jun. 10, 2005, at 8 (quoting NYPD deputy commissioner.
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need is greatest when prosecutors in urban jurisdictions charge young
clean-record minority defendants with petty nonviolent offenses, because
localized heavy enforcement of “borderline” offenses against such
sympathetic defendants poses the greatest threats to perceptions of
legitimacy.142 Street disorder may “annoy” members of urban
communities,143 but criminalizing their quasi-wayward children for
debatably unlawful conduct produces still more significant angst.144 By
contrast, stiffer sentences would seem less likely to provoke public
backlash (i) when conduct is patently wrong (for example, in the case of
assaults or forcible sexual contact),145 (ii) when defendants are recidivists,
or (iii) when the police arrest defendants in affluent white communities
that are not the principal targets of police crackdowns and that may, in
fact, favor rigid and punitive police response.146
Indeed, the New York City data track these assumptions. First, the
leniency trend was localized to the same communities that were the
principal targets of order-maintenance enforcement. Specifically, the data
show that Staten Island exhibited no clear leniency.147 Staten Island is
predominantly white, and it has the highest concentration of white
defendants of any borough (a plurality in the second period).148 Notably,
Staten Island did not embrace leniency even though it saw the largest
percentage growth of defendants without criminal records and of
defendants aged sixteen through twenty years old—the very defendants
who would otherwise seem most likely to benefit from grassroots plea
bargaining.149 By contrast, the Bronx—a predominantly minority borough
that was a policing focal point150—experienced one of the largest decreases
in average jail sentences and the lowest overall median sentences in the
second period.151
See supra notes 26-30, 38, 60 and accompanying notes.
Ellickson, supra note 27, at 1170.
144 See Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1897 (“[A] system that aims to criminalize not only that
which almost all of us condemn but also that which only most (or some) of us condemn,
is a system bound to produce not justice, but its opposite.”).
145 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
146 From my own experience as a public defender in Bronx County, prosecutors would
sometimes grouse to me in sum and substance, “You know you would never get this deal
in Westchester”—an affluent predominately white suburb immediately to the Bronx’s
north.
147 Supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text.
148 CJA, MISDEMEANOR TRENDS, supra note 20, at tbl.42.
149 Id. at tbls.40-41.
150 Hamblett, supra note 97 (noting a two-thirds rise in number of arrests in Bronx
from 1993 to 1998).
151 Id. at tbls. 40-41,47 (noting that Bronx sentences fell from a mean of 24.5 to 18.8
days and from a median of fifteen to five days). Separately, a statewide New York study
has shown that defendants in urban and predominantly minority jurisdictions received
142
143
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Second, the leniency trend was most pronounced for clean-record
nonviolent defendants, a growing percentage of whom were adolescents.152
By contrast, the data show (i) far more marginal leniency growth for
recidivist defendants, and (ii) markedly heightened punitive response for
all defendants in harm-to-person or sex cases.153 In short, prosecutors
directed grassroots plea bargaining to its most obvious targets, providing
greatest discounts to the very clean-record nonviolent defendants who
were most likely to rouse communal sympathy and spark potential
backlash.154
C.

A Normative Implication

If grassroots plea bargaining is a real force pushing down plea
prices in minority communities, then this raises a final highly charged
question: Is grassroots plea bargaining a redistributive correction to
recognized racial “tilts” in criminal justice enforcement?155 The answer is
yes and no. From a broad view, defendants in urban and minority-heavy
jurisdictions are bound to do better on balance.156 More specifically,
however, within discrete jurisdictions of every type—urban, suburban,
rural, poor, or rich—individual white defendants seem to do better than
minority defendants.157 Specifically, a statewide New York study found
that when all counties were analyzed collectively “whites were sentenced
to longer jail terms than minorities for almost all categories of arrest
charge, prior criminal record score, concurrent felony arrests, and age at
arrest . . . [because] [m]ost minorities were processed in counties that
sentenced defendants to relatively short terms, whereas most whites were
processed in counties that sentenced defendants to relatively long
lower sentences than defendants in more affluent and rural jurisdictions. NELSON, supra
note 75, at 70-73 & tbl.24; see also infra Part III.C.
152 See supra notes 79, 81, tbls.1,3 and accompanying text.
153 See supra notes 78, 81, tbl.3 and accompanying text.
154 Of course, it could also be that these defendants received better bargains, because
they were the subject of direct prosecutorial empathy. But there are reasons to believe
this was not the case. See supra notes 100-103, infra notes 160-161, and accompanying
text. In any event, as I have indicated from the start, my aim is not to prove that
grassroots plea-bargaining was the definitive reason for leniency in New York City in
the 1990s (I do not believe that it was), only that grassroots plea bargaining is a
plausible and heretofore unrecognized plea-bargaining influence. And the numbers are
wholly consistent with that proposition.
155 Stuntz, supra note 7, at 1893 (“Police and prosecutorial discretion have produced . .
. tilts . . . that target racial or ethnic minorities who live in urban priorities.”); cf. Stuntz,
supra note 24, at 1838 (raising possibility of enhanced punishment for affluent white
defendants, but conceding that such proposal would be politically impossible).
156 NELSON, supra note 75, at 70-73 & tbl.24.
157 Id.; see generally Munoz & Sapp, supra note 19, at 38, 42-43.

32

JOSH BOWERS

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

terms.”158 Conversely, when the study compared white defendants to
minority defendants in individual counties a “different pattern” emerged:
minorities were convicted and sent to jail more frequently, they received
longer jail sentences than whites, and they were offered fewer ACDs.159
Such racial disparities in favor of white defendants cut against
conventional perceptions that lenient treatment in urban communities
might just be the result of prosecutors’ own individualized conceptions of
appropriate punishment for poor minority defendants—some kind of
“white paternalism”160 or what Heather Gerken might call “dissenting by
deciding.”161 Rather, it seems that when prosecutors offer lenient prices of
their own volition, they typically exercise that kind of discretion to the
benefit of white defendants. Conversely, when prosecutors establish low
“going-rates” in urban jurisdictions, it is not because they want to, but
because they have to in order to avoid debilitating non-cooperation.162
NELSON, supra note 75, at 70-73 & tbl.24.
NELSON, supra note 75, at 31-40, 62-63, 70-73, 95 & tbls.11-13,20,24.
160 Munoz & Sapp, supra note 19, at 42 (“‘White paternalism’ . . . can work to the
detriment of Whites, particularly in counties with large non-white populations. . . .
Judges may be more attuned to the costs of overtly discriminating against non-Whites . .
. [or] judges may expect and have higher tolerance for non-White crime, and . . . hold
Whites to higher moral standards.”).
161 Heather K. Gerken, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2003) (“Dissenting by deciding
occurs when would-be dissenters—individuals who hold a minority view within the polity
as a whole—enjoy a local majority on a decisionmaking body and can thus dictate the
outcome.”). Examples of this kind of prosecutorial decision-making are San Francisco
District Attorney Terrence Hallinan’s announcement that he would no longer pursue
three-strike convictions for many types of felonies or Bronx District Attorney Robert
Johnson’s refusal to seek the death penalty in any case. See Jonathan DeMay, A District
Attorney’s Decision Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 767, 768-70
& 770 n.6 (1999); Tony Perry & Maura Dolan, Two Counties at Opposite Poles of '3
Strikes' Debate, L.A. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at A1. Dissenting by deciding, then, depends
on the prosecutor’s own views of proportionally appropriate punishment. For example,
District Attorney Robert Johnson declared that he had no “present intention” to pursue
the death penalty because of his personal “intense respect for the value and sanctity of
human life.” Demay, supra note 161. And Terrence Hallinan remarked: “I myself feel I
am able to tell the difference between a bad person and someone who has just done the
wrong thing.” Perry & Dolan, supra note 161.
162 The notion of plea prices as fixed “going rates” helps answer a further potential
objection. Specifically, one might posit that even if there is a pro-white bias, that bias is
of less force then grassroots plea bargaining. Accordingly, because white defendants
pose no obvious legitimacy threat (and do not, therefore, need to be given grassrootsplea-bargaining discounts), they should still do worse in predominantly minority
jurisdictions than minority defendants (who are the subjects of grassroots plea
bargaining). But white defendants in minority jurisdictions may end up receiving the
race-based discount and the grassroots-plea-bargaining discount. The reason for this
potential double discount is that plea prices for particular offenses in particular
jurisdictions start at fixed points—“going rates”—that are intuitively known to defense
attorneys and that prosecutors may not abandon without push back from defense
158
159
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The cynical view, then, is that grassroots plea bargaining may be no
more than a tool that enables unpopular and otherwise unsustainable
enforcement policies. In other words, beware of prosecutors bearing gifts;
they are mere agents of a normatively problematic and otherwiseunsustainable discriminatory status quo.163 The optimistic view is that
grassroots plea bargaining provides (in a pragmatic and politically
feasible way) a much-needed “bottom up” fix to an historically draconian,
unjust, and racially disparate “top down . . . punishment regime.”164 Such
a fix might not be all bad—whatever the prosecutorial motivation.
CONCLUSION
Prosecutors want to enable vigorous police enforcement, but they
concurrently wish to deflate communal perceptions of illegitimacy and
objections about unfair treatment. So, prosecutors set low prices for
public-order offenses in an effort to have their cake and eat it too. This is
grassroots plea bargaining, and it becomes a genuine influence anytime
the system attempts to strictly enforce “borderline” offenses against
members of communities that feature traditionally discordant policecitizen relations. As police and prosecutors shift to zero tolerance in their
arrest and charging decisions, prosecutors concurrently move toward
greater tolerance in their plea-bargaining decisions. In this way,
grassroots plea bargaining is just another instance of the oft-noted pattern
that when the system attempts to eliminate the exercise of discretion it

attorneys (and possibly judges). See Bowers, supra note 2, at Part III.C. So, in a
predominantly minority jurisdiction, the fixed opening price for all defendants—white or
minority—is the grassroots-plea-bargaining price. From there, a white defendant may
benefit yet further from implicit pro-white bias.
163 Under this reading, lenient plea deals pose the same problem that critical legal
theorists ascribe to the rhetoric of rights. See Peter Gabel & Duncan Kennedy, Roll Over
Beethoven, 36 STAN. L. REV. 1, 26 (1984) (“[T]hey start talking as if ‘we’ were rightsbearing citizens who are ‘allowed’ to do this or that by something called ‘the state,’ which
is a passivizing illusion-actually a hallucination which establishes the presumptive
political legitimacy of the status quo.”); cf. Seidman, supra note 140, at 207, 210-11
(arguing that procedural protections “entrench the status quo” by “mak[ing] the
punishment we inflict on criminal defendants seem more acceptable” and by therefore
“contribut[ing] to an atmosphere that promotes acceptance of a situation that ought to
shock us”); Louis Michael Seidman, Brown and Miranda, 80 CAL. L. REV. 673 (1992)..
164 Butler, supra note 60, at 1000. Grassroots plea bargaining thereby helps to ensure
the “tolerably moderate” punishments that Meares and Kahan advocated upon
defending gang-loitering ordinances. Meares & Kahan, supra note 32, at 213 (emphasis
in original); see also supra note 36. Along this line, some critics of order-maintenance
policing have proposed reducing petty misdemeanors to statutory violations. See e.g.,
Harcourt & Ludwig, supra note 64, at 3. To some extent, by offering such frequent plea
reductions and ACDs, prosecutors have de facto adopted this proposal.
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merely pushes that exercise to other points in the process.165
Ultimately, more work must be done to determine (i) the scope of
grassroots plea bargaining, (ii) whether it is normatively positive, and (iii)
whether it even succeeds in fostering communal perceptions of legitimacy
in the face of unpopular enforcement policies. It could be that these
questions prove unanswerable. Some theorists have argued, after all, that
diverse influences on real-world bargaining are “unquantifiable”—either
collectively or in isolation.166 If this is so, all we can hope to do is put
fingers down on as many of these manifold influences as possible.
Grassroots plea bargaining is such an influence. It is one more force
pulling crime and punishment outside the shadow of law.

Readers with comments may address them to:
Josh Bowers
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
bowers@uchicago.edu

165 See MICHAEL TONRY, SENTENCING MATTERS 147 (1996) (“Sentencing policy can only
be as mandatory as police, prosecutors, and judges choose to make it.”).
166 See, e.g., Barnhizer, supra note 21, at 171 (arguing that the only quasi-effective
measurement of bargaining power is a loose “multifactor balancing test”).

35

JOSH BOWERS

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

The University of Chicago Law School
Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper Series
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Cass R. Sunstein and Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions (November
1999; Ethics, v.110, no. 1)
Joseph Isenbergh, Impeachment and Presidential Immunity from Judicial Process
(November 1999; forthcoming Yale Law and Policy Review v.18 #1).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional? (August 1999; Michigan Law
Review #3).
Elizabeth Garrett, The Law and Economics of “Informed Voter” Ballot Notations
(November 1999, University of Virginia Law Review, v. 85).
David A. Strauss, Do Constitutional Amendments Matter? (November 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Standing for Animals (November 1999)
Cass R. Sunstein, Culture and Government Money: A Guide for the Perplexed (April
2000).
Emily Buss, Without Peers? The Blind Spot in the Debate over How to Allocate
Educational Control between Parent and State (April 2000).
David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle (June
2000).
Curtis A. Bradley and Jack L. Goldsmith, Treaties, Human Rights, and Conditional
Consent (May 2000; Pennsylvania Law Review v. 149).
Mary Ann Case, Lessons for the Future of Affirmative Action from the Past of the
Religion Clauses? (May 2001, Supreme Court Review, 2000)
Cass R. Sunstein, Social and Economic Rights? Lessons from South Africa (May,
2000).
Jill Elaine Hasday, Parenthood Divided: A Legal History of the Bifurcated Law of
Parental Relations (June 2001)
Elizabeth Garrett, Institutional Lessons from the 2000 Presidential Election (May
2001).
Richard A. Epstein, The Allocation of the Commons: Parking and Stopping on the
Commons (August 2001).
Jack Goldsmith, The Internet and the Legitimacy of Remote Cross-Border Searches
(October 2001).
Adrian Vermeule, Does Commerce Clause Review Have Perverse Effects? (October
2001).
Cass R. Sunstein, Of Artificial Intelligence and Legal Reasoning (November 2001).
Elizabeth Garrett, The Future of Campaign Finance Reform Laws in the Courts and in
Congress, The William J. Brennan Lecture in Constitutional Law (December 2001).
Julie Roin, Taxation without Coordination (March 2002).
Geoffrey R. Stone, Above the Law: Research Methods, Ethics, and the Law of
Privilege (March 2002; forthcoming J. Sociological Methodology 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Is There a Constitutional Right to Clone? (March 2002).
Emily Buss, Parental Rights (May 2002, forthcoming Virginia Law Review).
David A. Strauss, Must Like Cases Be Treated Alike? (May 2002).
David A. Strauss, The Common Law Genius of the Warren Court (May 2002).
Jack Goldsmith and Ryan Goodman, U.S. Civil Litigation and International Terrorism
(June 2002).
Jack Goldsmith and Cass R. Sunstein, Military Tribunals and Legal Culture: What a
Difference Sixty Years Makes (June 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions (July 2002).

36

JOSH BOWERS

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

Elizabeth Garrett, Is the Party Over? The Court and the Political Process (August
2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals: A Very Short Primer (August 2002).
Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice (November 2002).
Julie Roin, Truth in Government: Beyond the Tax Expenditure Budget (November
2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics (November 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Conformity and Dissent (November 2002).
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Principle and Practice of Women’s “Full Citizenship”: A Case
Study of Sex-Segregated Public Education (December 2002).
Cass R. Sunstein, Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic
Guarantees? (January 2003).
Adrian Vermeule, Mead in the Trenches (January 2003).
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle (January 2003).
Adrian Vermeule, The Constitutional Law of Congressional Procedure (February
2003).
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Transitional Justice as Ordinary Justice (March
2003).
Emily Buss, Children’s Associational Rights? Why Less Is More (March 2003)
Emily Buss, The Speech Enhancing Effect of Internet Regulation (March 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron
(May 2003)
Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron (April 2003)
Eric A. Posner, Transfer Regulations and Cost-Effectiveness Analysis (April 2003)
Mary Ann Case, Developing a Taste for Not Being Discriminated Against (May 2003)
Saul Levmore and Kyle Logue, Insuring against Terrorism—and Crime (June 2003)
Eric Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Accommodating Emergencies (September 2003)
Adrian Vermeule, The Judiciary Is a They, Not an It: Two Fallacies of Interpretive
Theory (September 2003)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary
Investigation (September 2003)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil
Liberties, and Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally
(November 2003)
Jenia Iontcheva, Nationalizing International Criminal Law: The International Criminal
Court As a Roving Mixed Court (January 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Destroy (January 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Submajority Rules (in Legislatures and Elsewhere) (January 2004)
Jide Nzelibe, The Credibility Imperative: The Political Dynamics of Retaliation in the
World Trade Organization’s Dispute Resolution Mechanism (January 2004)
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Directions in Sexual Harassment Law: Afterword (January
2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Black on Brown (February 2004)
Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence (February 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, You Are Entering a Gay- and Lesbian-Free Zone: On the Radical
Dissents of Justice Scalia and Other (Post-) Queers (February 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Selection Effects in Constitutional Law (March 2004)
Derek Jinks and David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?
(July 2004)

37

JOSH BOWERS

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

Derek Jinks and Ryan Goodman, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law (March 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Alan O. Sykes, Optimal War and Jus Ad Bellum (April 2004)
Derek Jinks, Protective Parity and the Law of War (April 2004)
Derek Jinks, The Declining Significance of POW Status (April 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Unconstitutional Police Searches and Collective Responsibility
(June 2004)
Bernard E. Harcourt, On Gun Registration, the NRA, Adolf Hitler, and Nazi Gun
Laws: Exploding the Gun Culture Wars {A Call to Historians} (June 2004)
Jide Nzelibe, The Uniqueness of Foreign Affairs (July 2004)
Derek Jinks, Disaggregating “War” (July 2004)
Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and the Americans with Disabilities Act (August 2004)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death (August 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Group Judgments: Deliberation, Statistical Means, and Information
Markets (August 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Constitutional Amendments and the Constitutional Common Law
(September 2004)
Elizabeth Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness and the ADA
(September 2004)
Adrian Vermeule, Three Strategies of Interpretation (October 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, The Right to Marry (October 2004)
Jill Elaine Hasday, The Canon of Family Law (October 2004)
Adam M. Samaha, Litigant Sensitivity in First Amendment Law (November 2004)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, A Social Networks Theory of Privacy (December 2004)
Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War (December 2004)
Eric A. Posner, The Decline of the International Court of Justice (December 2004)
Tim Wu, The Breach Theory of Treaty Enforcement (February 2005, revised March
2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Libertarian Panics (February 2005)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive Interrogation Be Legal?
(March 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein and Adrian Vermeule, Is Capital Punishment Morally Required? The
Relevance of Life-Life Tradeoffs (March 2005)
Adam B. Cox, Partisan Gerrymandering and Disaggregated Redistricting (April 2005)
Eric A. Posner, Political Trials in Domestic and International Law (April 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic (April 2005)
Adam B. Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics (April 2005, NYU L. Rev.
70, #3)
Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War (May 2005, Harvard L. Rev.,
forthcoming)
Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero (May 2005)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Policing L.A.’s Skid Row: Crime and Real Estate
Development in Downtown Los Angeles [An Experiment in Real Time]
(May 2005)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence
from New York City and a Five-City Social Experiment (May 2005)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Against Prediction: Sentencing, Policing, and
Punishing in an Actuarial Age (May 2005)
Philip Hamburger, The New Censorship: Institutional Review Boards
(May 2005)
38

JOSH BOWERS

96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

Eugene Kontorovich, Disrespecting the “Opinions of Mankind” (June 2005)
Tim Wu, Intellectual Property, Innovation, and Decision Architectures
(June 2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Exclusionary Amenities in Residential Commons
(July 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Ranking Law Schools: A Market Test? (July 2005)
Mary Anne Case, Pets or Meat (August 2005)
Adam Samaha, Executive Exposure: Government Secrets, Constitutional
Law, and Platforms for Judicial Intervention (August 2005, revised
November 2005)
Jason J. Czarnezki and William K. Ford, The Phantom Philosophy? An
Empirical Investigation of Legal Interpretation (August 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Absolute Voting Rules (August 2005)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Emergencies and Democratic Failure
(August 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Reparations as Rough Justice (September 2005)
Arthur J. Jacobson and John P. McCormick, The Business of Business Is
Democracy (September 2005)
Tracey Meares and Kelsi Brown Corkran, When 2 or 3 Come Together
(October 2005)
Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform (October
2005)
Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Information Asymmetries and the Rights to
Exclude (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Fast, Frugal and (Sometimes) Wrong (November 2005)
Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic Pragmatism (November
2005)
Adam M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires: From Religious Symbols to AntiSorting Principles (November 2005)
Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process: Congressional Referral and Judicial
Resistance in the Schiavo Controversy (November 2005)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Should We Aggregate Mental Hospitalization and
Prison Population Rates in Empirical Research on the Relationship
between Incarceration and Crime, Unemployment, Poverty, and Other
Social Indicators? On the Continuity of Spatial Exclusion and
Confinement in Twentieth Century United States (January 2006)
Elizabeth Garrett and Adrian Vermeule, Transparency in the Budget
Process (January 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Burkean Minimalism (January 2006)
Stephanos Bibas, Transparency and Participation in Criminal Procedure
(February 2006)
Douglas G. Lichtman, Captive Audiences and the First Amendment
(February 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States (March
2006)
Jeff Leslie and Cass R. Sunstein, Animal Rights without Controversy
(March 2006)
Adrian Vermeule, The Delegation Lottery (March 2006)
Adrian Vermeule, Self-Defeating Proposals: Ackerman on Emergency
39

JOSH BOWERS

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

Powers (March 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Muslim Profiles Post 9/11: Is Racial Profiling an
Effective Counterterrorist Measure and Does It Violate the Right to Be
Free from Discrimination? (March 2006)
Christine Jolls and Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias (April 2006)
Lior Strahilevitz, “How’s My Driving?” for Everyone (and Everything?)
(April 2006)
Jack Goldsmith and Eric A. Posner, The New International Law
Scholarship (May 2006)
Eric A. Posner and John Yoo, International Law and the Rise of China
(May 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law
(May 2006)
Jacob E. Gersen and Adrian Vermeule, Chevron as a Voting Rule (June
2006)
Jacob E. Gersen, Temporary Legislation (June 2006)
Adam B. Cox, Designing Redistricting Institutions (June 2006)
Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights (July 2006)
Curtis A. Bradley and Eric A. Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and
Executive Power (July 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security:
Hamdan and Beyond (July 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Of Snakes and Butterflies: A Reply (August 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Montreal versus Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols
(September 2006)
Douglas Lichtman, Irreparable Benefits (September 2006)
Adam M. Samaha, Undue Process (September 2006)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, The Credible Executive (September
2006)
Adam B. Cox and Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of
Immigration Law (November 2006)
Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some
Skeptical Observations (November 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt and Jens Ludwig, Reefer Madness: Broken Windows
Policing and Misdemeanor Marijuana Arrests in New York City, 1989–
2000 (December 2006)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Embracing Chance: Post-Modern Meditations on
Punishment (December 2006)
Cass R. Sunstein, Second-Order Perfectionism (December 2006)
Wayne Hsiung and Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change and Animals
(January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberating Groups versus Prediction Markets (or Hayek’s
Challenge to Habermas) (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional
Law (January 2007)
Eric A. Posner, Climate Change and Human Rights Litigation: A Critical
Appraisal (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis without Analyzing Costs or
Benefits: Reasonable Accommodation, Balancing,a nd Stigmatic Harms
40

JOSH BOWERS

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

GRASSROOTS PLEA BARGAINING

(January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Willingness to Pay versus Welfare (January 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, If People Would Be Outraged by Their Rulings, Should
Judges Care? (February 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, Judge Richard Posner on Civil Liberties: Pragmatic
Authoritarian Libertarian (March 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, What Standing Is Good For (March 2007)
Eugene Kontorovich, Inefficient Customs in International Law (March
2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, From the Asylum to the Prison: Rethinking the
Incarceration Revolution. Part II: State Level Analysis (March 2007)
Bernard E. Harcourt, An Answer to the Question: “What Is
Poststructuralism?” (March 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Backlash’s Travels (March 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Due Process Traditionalism (March 2007)
Adam B. Cox and Thomas J. Miles, Judging the Voting Rights Act (March
2007)
Jonathan F. Mitchell, Apprendi’s Domain (April 2007)
Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in
Administrative Law (April 2007)
Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, On Learning from Others (April
2007)
Eric A. Posner and Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and Emergencies: A
Reply to Lawson (April 2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses (April 2007)
Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent (April 2007)
Adam M. Samaha, What Good Is the Social Model of Disability? (May
2007)
Cass R. Sunstein, On the Tension between Sex Equality and Religious
Freedom (June 2007)
Jacob E. Gersen, Legislative Rules Revisited (June 2007)
Josh Bowers, Grassroots Plea Bargaining (June 2007)

41

